The Information Content of Cost Behavior Components: Evidence from Labor Market Flows by Wan Wongsunwai et al.
1 
 
The Information Content of Cost Behavior Components: 




We examine the information content of cost behavior components in firms’ asymmetric cost 
function, namely, aggregate-level elasticities of costs with respect to sales increases vs. decreases. 
We show that the persistence of the elasticity of costs is higher for sales increases than for sales 
decreases. Using business-level job flows from the Business Employment Dynamics (BED) 
dataset, which has recently been made available by the BLS, we find that, after accounting for 
GDP growth and other macroeconomic indicators, the aggregate elasticity of costs with respect to 
sales increases explains gross job inflows, but not gross job outflows. On the other hand, the 
aggregate elasticity of costs with respect to sales decreases explains gross job outflows, but not 
gross job inflows. When we include both elasticities in the regression, both are significant but with 
opposite signs. We obtain similar results in vector autoregression (VAR) models. Additional tests 
indicate that: (a) the effect of aggregate elasticity of costs with respect to sales decreases is more 
pronounced in periods with high uncertainty; and (b) asymmetric cost models explain more of the 






A growing body of literature, beginning with Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman (2003) 
(hereinafter ABJ), studies cost behavior and assumes a non-symmetric relation between costs and 
activities: costs increase more when activity rises than they decrease when activity falls by an 
equivalent amount. In particular, the literature estimates a log-linear cost function to capture the 
asymmetry, with a separate coefficient for firms that experienced an increase in sales (hereinafter 
βSU) and an incremental coefficient for firms that experienced a decrease in sales during the period 
(hereinafter βSD). These coefficients are interpreted in the literature as the elasticity of costs to 
increasing or decreasing sales. In this paper, we study the information content of both coefficients 
at the aggregate level, by focusing on business-level job-flows.  
We use the Business Employment Dynamics (BED) quarterly data on job flows provided 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). While traditional employment data, which are based on 
the Current Population Survey (CPS), are gathered at the worker level, the BED data are collected 
at the business (i.e., the firm or establishment) level.1 Boon, Carson, Faberman, and Ilg (2008) 
argue that, compared with other sources of employment data, the BED data are more appropriate 
for analyzing the business side of the labor market because they provide information on positions 
and not employees. Furthermore, the BED data provide flow information, in particular, gross 
inflows and outflows of jobs each quarter. Studying job inflows and outflows separately allows us 
to better evaluate the differential impact of firms’ cost behavior components. We also note that the 
BED data are available with a lag of three quarters and hence are less timely than the CPS data, 
which are compiled every month and released at the beginning of the following month. Because 
                                                            
1 The data cover all establishments covered by State unemployment insurance programs. 
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our focus in this paper is to understand how cost behavior components relate to the labor market, 
rather than forecasting of unemployment per se, the BED data fit our purpose.  
We estimate quarterly time-series of aggregate-level βSU and βSD for all public firms in the 
United States for the period Q3:1992 to Q2:2017. Prior literature suggests that the two coefficients 
capture different aspects of firms’ cost behavior. βSU captures the elasticity of changes in costs to 
increases in sales, with a greater coefficient reflecting more elastic (less rigid) cost structure (Lev 
1974; Noreen 1991; Kallapur and Eldenburg 2005; Aboody, Levi and Weiss 2018). As such, it 
reflects managers’ long-term capacity and production-technology choices and cannot be easily 
altered in the short-run. βSD captures the incremental resource retention when sales decrease—that 
is, the difference between change in costs when sales increase and change in costs when sales 
decrease by an equivalent amount. By its very nature, this coefficient reflects the level of 
adjustment costs to reduce or restore committed resources as well as short-term managerial 
expectations (ABJ 2003). Both coefficients are determined by the current production technology, 
capacity choices, level of adjustment costs, and managers’ discretion when making decisions about 
resources. Yet, βSU is likely to reflect the elasticity of the production technology and managers’ 
long-run operational and capacity choices to a larger extent, while βSD is more likely to capture 
adjustment costs and managerial short-term expectations.2  
We begin our analysis by studying the time-series properties of each coefficient, by 
estimating its persistence over time. We expect the persistence of the aggregate elasticity of costs 
with respect to sales increases (βSU) to be higher than the persistence of the aggregate elasticity of 
costs with respect to sales decreases (βSD), for the following reasons. First, sales decline is typically 
                                                            
2 There are vast literatures on βSD, the stickiness coefficient, and also on the coefficient of a symmetric cost function. 
βSU, per se, has not been studied extensively, and hence we draw from the literature on firms’ cost structure when we 
interpret this coefficient. 
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only temporary. Hence, at the aggregate level, the composition of firms experiencing declining 
sales is likely to change substantially from one quarter to the next. Second, at the firm level, βSU  
is likely to reflect long-term decisions, such as the choice of capacity and production technology, 
while the decision to cut down resources, reflected in βSD is more short-term in nature and is 
typically made only after reduced demand realization is observed. Our findings indicate that both 
coefficients are highly persistent, which is to be expected because they reflect aggregate 
elasticities. Consistent with our expectations, we also find that the persistence of βSU is higher than 
the persistence of βSD.  
 We next examine the explanatory power of each coefficient individually. We regress 
contemporaneous gross job inflow and outflow rates on the aggregate βSU and βSD coefficients and 
control variables. We find that βSU is related to gross job inflow rate, but not gross job outflow 
rate. Conditional on GDP growth and other macroeconomic indicators, a larger βSU entails a greater 
increase in resources, and hence greater job inflows. βSU fails to predict the gross job outflow rate 
due to the asymmetric nature of cost behavior. Specifically, the actual reduction in resources is 
likely to be different from the one predicted by βSU, due to cost stickiness. We also find that βSD is 
negatively related to gross job outflows but is not related to inflows, consistent with βSD reflecting 
resource retention decisions. Conditional on macroeconomic indicators, a larger βSD entails greater 
resource retention and hence less job outflows.  
When we include both coefficients in the regression, we find that they both predict gross 
job inflow and outflow rates, but with opposite signs. βSU is positive, whereas βSD loads negatively. 
Conditional on the inclusion of βSD, GDP growth, and other macroeconomic indicators, a larger 
βSU indicates greater job inflows and job outflows because of the greater elasticity of the cost 
function. Conditional on the inclusion of βSU and macroeconomic indicators, a larger βSD indicates 
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less job outflows, but also less job inflows due to the higher level of adjustment costs to reduce or 
restore committed resources that affect both contraction and expansion. Moreover, the coefficient 
on βSU is always larger in absolute value than the coefficient on βSD. This result is consistent with 
the greater persistence of βSU compared with βSD.  
Having documented the information content of the two macro-level elasticities using 
contemporaneous job flows, we now examine their relationship to future job flows. Given the high 
persistence of both coefficients, we expect that they will explain not only contemporaneous flows, 
but also future ones. Indeed, both coefficients predict future flows up to four quarters ahead.  
We next examine second moment properties of the βSD coefficient. We interpret the 
standard error of the estimated βSD coefficients—SE(βSD)—as indicating uncertainty. A higher 
value of this standard error implies a less precise βSD estimate, which indicates greater dispersion 
among firms in their level of resource retention, which in turn reflects different opinions about 
future macroeconomic conditions. We examine whether the explanatory power of βSD varies with 
uncertainty. We find that the standard error of the estimated βSD coefficient is higher at the onset 
of recessionary periods, consistent with the higher level of uncertainty, and that, conditional on 
βSD, higher standard error of βSD is associated with less job outflows, indicating greater employee 
retention in periods of high uncertainty.  
Finally, we compare the model assuming an asymmetric cost behavior (i.e., sticky costs) 
to a traditional model that assumes symmetry. To do so, we estimate the time series of βSYM, which 
assumes a symmetric relation between change in costs and increases and decreases in sales. We 
then use βSYM in the regressions of gross job inflow and outflow rates. We find that, for a given 
level of GDP growth and conditional on macroeconomic indicators, a larger βSYM is associated 
with greater job outflows as well as greater job inflows.  
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We compare the explanatory power of a model that includes βSYM to a model that includes 
both βSD and βSU, by examining the R-squared of the two models. Vuong (1989) tests indicate a 
statistically significant improvement in the R-squared of the asymmetric cost model when 
explaining the gross and net job outflow rates, but not the gross job inflow rate, consistent with 
the information content of βSD reflecting the sticky nature of costs.  
We augment the OLS results by estimating vector autoregression (VAR) models. The VAR 
approach takes into account time-series interdependencies of the different variables of interest. 
One major disadvantage of VAR models, however, is the need to estimate a very large number of 
coefficients (Robertson and Tallman 1999). In particular, compared to an OLS regression, the 
number of cross-sectional predictors that a VAR model can handle is relatively limited, because 
the number of coefficients to be estimated grows exponentially with the number of variables. We 
run a reduced-form VAR, which builds on Okun’s law (Okun 1963). Okun’s law documents a 
robust negative relationship between output (GDP) growth and unemployment rate changes. We 
decompose the change in unemployment rate into gross job inflow rate and gross job outflow rate, 
and we include the βSU and βSD coefficients. Results from the VAR analysis are in line with the 
conclusions from the OLS regressions.  
This paper contributes to several streams of literature. First, we contribute to the cost 
accounting literature on sticky costs (Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman 2003; Banker and Chen 
2006; Anderson, Banker, Huang, and Janakiraman 2007; Weiss 2010; Kama and Weiss 2013; 
Rouxelin, Wongsunwai, and Yehuda 2018). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to 
examine the differential information content (with respect to the labor market) of aggregate cost 
elasticities to sales increases (βSU) and sales decreases (βSD). Our study employs a relatively new 
dataset that has been understudied in the literature—the BED dataset—and includes information 
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about job flows at the firm level and hence is more suitable to analyze firms’ cost structure. 
Furthermore, we compare the symmetric and the asymmetric costs models at the aggregate level 
and show the incremental informativeness of the asymmetric cost behavior model. 
Second, we contribute to the macroeconomics literature on unemployment rate. We show 
how the aggregate cost elasticity to sales increases (βSU) and sales decreases (βSD) relate to job 
inflows and outflows in business establishments. Recent research on unemployment forecasting 
emphasizes the importance of separately predicting each type of flow. Using the refined BED data 
at the establishment level, we are better able to assess separately the effect of each of the 
coefficients βSD and βSU. 
Third, our paper integrates a cost accounting research topic, asymmetric cost behavior, 
with the financial accounting literature on the usefulness of aggregate accounting information in 
predicting the macroeconomy (e.g., Jorgensen, Li, and Sadka. 2012; Konchitchki and Patatoukas 
2014; Gallo, Hann, and Li 2016; Nallareddy and Ogneva 2017). The importance of integrating 
insights from financial and managerial accounting research and other literatures has long been 
acknowledged (e.g., Hemmer and Labro 2008; Banker and Byzalov 2014). 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We review related literature and develop 
our main prediction in Section 2. Section 3 describes the data and provides descriptive statistics. 





2. Related Literature and Main Prediction 
 
2.1 The Information Content of Cost Behavior Components 
A growing body of literature, beginning with ABJ (2003), studies cost behavior and 
assumes a non-symmetric relation between costs and sales: costs increase more when activity rises 
than they decrease when activity falls by an equivalent amount. In particular, the literature captures 
the asymmetry by estimating a log-linear cost function, with a separate coefficient for firms that 
experienced an increase in sales (βSU) and an incremental coefficient for firms that experienced a 
decrease in sales during the period (βSD).  
Prior research has studied the coefficients at the firm level. βSU is typically interpreted as 
elasticity of cost to increases in demand — that is, the percentage change in costs for a 1 percent 
increase in sales.3 A higher slope indicates a more elastic cost structure with a lower proportion of 
fixed costs and a higher proportion of variable costs, or a lower operating leverage (Lev 1974; 
Cooper and Kaplan 1987; Noreen and Soderstrom 1994, 1997; Kallapur and Eldenburg 2005; 
Banker, Byzalov, and Plehn-Dujowich 2013). The lower the slope coefficient, the more rigid is 
the firm’s cost structure. Additionally, βSU can also be interpreted as the ratio of marginal cost to 
average cost (Noreen and Soderstrom 1994) or the ratio of variable costs to total costs if total costs 
are linear in volume (Kallapur and Eldenburg 2005).  
A more elastic cost structure offers companies greater flexibility because it involves fewer 
upfront cost commitments (i.e., fewer fixed costs). A firm’s cost structure is determined by its 
production technology. Yet, firms can transform fixed costs into variable costs via a process of 
variabilization. Under this process, activities involving higher fixed costs are outsourced. Recent 
managerial accounting papers study how the business environment in which the firm operates 
                                                            
3 A large literature studies this coefficient. Yet, this literature assumes a symmetric cost function. The cost stickiness 
literature, on the other hand, has mainly studied the properties of the incremental βSD coefficient. 
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affects its cost rigidity. Using data from the hospital industry, Kallapur and Eldenburg (2005) and 
Holzhacker, Krishnan, and Mahlendorf (2015) identify resource procurement choices made by 
hospitals facing higher demand uncertainty. These choices include the degree of outsourcing, the 
proportion of leased equipment versus owned equipment, and the proportion of contract labor 
versus fixed-term salaried employees. 
In contrast, Banker, Byzalov, and Plehn-Dujowich (2013) demonstrate that, in response to 
higher demand uncertainty, firms choose a more rigid short-run cost structure. They assume a 
production technology with a fixed capacity resource that is chosen in advance and a variable 
resource that is chosen after the demand is realized. When demand is unusually high relative to 
capacity, the firm bears high congestion costs due to strained capacity. Consequently, managers 
prefer to commit sufficient capacity in advance to avoid excessive congestion costs, which can 
considerably reduce the firm’s profitability.  
The βSD coefficient has also been studied in the literature on cost stickiness. ABJ (2003) 
argue that this coefficient captures the effect of deliberate managerial decisions about committed 
resources when there is uncertainty about future demand for their firms’ products. In particular, 
greater magnitude of adjustment costs leads to greater cost stickiness because the firm’s behavior 
under optimal decision-making is asymmetric. With labor, severance and training costs can be 
significant. Faced with declining sales, managers are reluctant to fire workers because retaining 
the unused resources helps avoid the large staff termination costs and future training costs when 
rehiring. Conversely, when activity increases, although managers may be reluctant to hire more 
workers because of the adjustment costs, the increase in current sales can only be achieved if 
additional workers are hired, thus the reluctance effect is likely to be more muted (Banker and 
Byzalov 2014; Banker, Byzalov, and Chen 2013).  
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The literature has offered additional explanations for this coefficient. First, cost stickiness 
is indicative of managerial expectations regarding future demand for the firm’s products (Banker, 
Byzalov, Ciftci, and Mashruwala 2014). Managerial optimism weakens cost response to current 
sales decreases and amplifies cost response to current sales increases, thereby resulting in 
increased cost stickiness. Second, cost stickiness can be the result of managers’ empire-building 
incentives to maximize resources under their control. Larger resources can give managers more 
power, potentially higher compensation, and other perquisites (Anderson, Banker, and 
Janakiraman 2003; Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis 2012; Kama and Weiss 2013). Empire-building 
managers will cut resources only moderately when sales decrease and will expand resources 
excessively when sales increase. 
 
2.2 Empirical Prediction 
We expect the two beta coefficients to capture different aspects of firms’ cost behavior. 
βSU captures the elasticity of changes in costs to increases in sales, with a greater coefficient 
reflecting more elastic (less rigid) cost structure. This coefficient is the result of managers’ long-
term decision about capacity and production technology, and cannot be easily altered. βSD captures 
the incremental resource retention when sales decrease—that is, the difference between change in 
costs when sales increase and change in costs when sales decrease by an equivalent amount. As 
such, this coefficient reflects the level of adjustment costs to reduce or restore committed resources 
as well as managerial discretion (ABJ 2003). Moreover, the decision to scale down resources is 
often made after observing demand realization, and hence this decision is more short-term in 
nature.   
Both coefficients are determined by the current production-technology, capacity level, 
adjustment cost level, and managers’ discretion when making resource-decisions. Yet, βSU is likely 
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to reflect the elasticity of the production technology to a larger extent, while βSD is more likely to 
capture adjustment costs and short-run managerial expectations. This is because the cost structure 
of the firm (i.e., βSU) is the result of managers’ long-term capacity and operational choices. Indeed, 
Holzhacker, Krishnan, and Mahlendorf (2015) argue that changes to a firm’s cost structure usually 
require modifications to the firm’s operations that are not easily reversible. In contrast, cost 
stickiness reflects managers’ short-term decisions to retain unused resources, and hence is more 
likely to capture timelier managerial expectations (Banker, Byzalov, and Plehn-Dujowich 2013). 
 
3. Data 
3.1 The Business Employment Dynamics (BED) Data 
We obtain quarterly data on job inflows and outflows from the Business Employment 
Dynamics (BED) dataset provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The BED contains 
longitudinally-linked administrative records for all establishments covered by state unemployment 
insurance agencies.  
Spletzer, Faberman, Sadeghi, Talan, and Clayton (2004) argue that, while the traditional 
unemployment rate identifies the overall growth or decline of the labor market, it does not convey 
the underlying heterogeneity of job inflows and job outflows at the establishment level. Job inflows 
are the sum of all employment increases at opening or expanding establishments. Job outflows are 





3.2 The Sample 
Our sample period is Q3:1992 to Q2:2017. We begin our sample in Q3:1992 because this 
is the earliest quarter covered by the BED dataset.4 We collect quarterly financial statement data 
from the Compustat North America Quarterly Database. Since the BLS compiles the BED data on 
a quarterly basis, using quarterly data sources provides a natural alignment with the data generation 
process for the key dependent variables in our analyses. 
We implement the methodology in ABJ (2003) to estimate βSU and βSD, by regressing the 
sum of SG&A expenses (Compustat data item xsgaq), and cost of goods sold (cogsq) on sales 
revenue (data item saleq). We combine expenses for COGS and SG&A to proxy for labor cost. 
We use available data for all U.S. industrial companies available on Compustat. In line with prior 
research (e.g., Banker and Byzalov 2014), we winsorize all continuous variables at 0.5% tails 
within each quarter and 2-digit SIC industry. 
We estimate the following regression each quarter: 
log ቂ ሺ஼ைீௌାௌீ&஺ሻ௟௔௚ሺ஼ைீௌାௌீ&஺ሻቃ ൌ 𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵ log ቂ
ௌ஺௅ாௌ
௟௔௚ሺௌ஺௅ாௌሻቃ ൅ 𝛽ଶ 𝐼_𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 ൈ log ቂ
ௌ஺௅ாௌ
௟௔௚ሺௌ஺௅ாௌሻቃ ൅ 𝜀  (1)
In each calendar quarter q, we estimate regression (1) using Compustat firm-quarter data 
with fiscal quarters ending in [q–3, q]. We seasonally adjust changes in costs and sales. The 
indicator variable I_Decrease takes value 1 if seasonal change in quarterly sales (sales reported in 
the current quarter compared to four quarter ago) is negative and 0 otherwise. βSU is equivalent to 
standardized β1 (i.e., after subtracting sample mean of the estimated β1 values and dividing by the 
sample standard deviation). βSD is calculated as standardized β2 multiplied by −1, to facilitate easier 
interpretation (higher value of βSD indicates more sticky costs).  
                                                            




3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. 
The gross job inflow rate, expressed as a percentage of total employment, had a mean value of 
7.11% for our sample period, with a standard deviation of 0.82%. The gross job outflow rate, on 
the other hand, averaged 6.79% with 0.75% standard deviation. 
We estimate β1 and β2 coefficients by running rolling OLS regression models following 
equation (1), using all Compustat industrial firms. The β1 and β2 estimates have means of 0.410 
and -0.053, respectively. Thus, for a given quarter, firms report an average increase of 0.41% in 
their operating costs for every 1% increase in sales revenue, whereas firms report a cost decrease 
of only 0.36% (0.410% − 0.053%) per 1% decrease in sales revenue. 
We next present descriptive statistics for the four sets of control variables that are known 
to explain the change in the level of unemployment (Rouxelin, Wongsunwai, and Yehuda 2018). 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. The first set of control variables captures the overall 
macroeconomy and includes the growth in real GDP (GDP), aggregate GAAP earnings (Earn), 
change in earnings (ΔEarn), stock market return (MktRet) and the industrial production index (IPI). 
We use estimates of real GDP growth rate as released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Over 
our sample period, this variable averaged 2.53% but with substantial variation (standard deviation 
of 1.95%). We also control for aggregate earnings (Earnt), and stock market return (MktRett). The 
industrial production index (IPIt), published by the Federal Reserve Board, measures the real 
output of all manufacturing, mining, and electric and gas utility establishment in the U.S. 
Our second set of controls are proxies for different explanations of cost stickiness that have 
been identified in prior literature: (a) BBD Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index, which 
captures the level of policy-related economic uncertainty (Baker, Bloom, and Davis 2014; Bloom 
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2014). This index is likely to be correlated with uncertainty about future activities, a potential 
driver of cost stickiness; (b) the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI). This 
index gauges consumers’ level of optimism or pessimism, which is likely to be correlated with 
managers’ level of optimism or pessimism, another potential explanation for cost stickiness. The 
third set of control variables includes federal funds (i.e., interest) rate (IR) and inflation rate (Inf), 
following Taylor’s (1993) rule.  
Our final set of controls includes factors that have been proposed in prior literature as 
predictors of unemployment specifically (rather than of the macroeconomy as a whole), consisting 
of labor-force flows and labor reallocations. 5  The four-week average change in initial 
unemployment insurance claims (UIC) (people who filed for unemployment benefits for the first 
time during the previous month) and the composite Help-Wanted Index (HWI) (percentage of job 
openings or vacancies out of the total labor force) are proxies for labor flows, often used in 
policymaking (e.g., Barnichon 2010). Employment growth dispersion (Lilien 1982) and return 
dispersion (Loungani, Rush, and Tave 1990; Brainard and Cutler 1993; Nallareddy and Ogneva 
2017) are proxies for performance dispersion.  
Panel B of Table 1 presents the correlation matrix between the BED job flow rates and the 
change in the traditional unemployment rate, which is based on CPS responses. Change in 
unemployment rate is positively and significantly associated with net job outflow rate (difference 
between gross job outflow rate and gross job inflow rate). Furthermore, gross job inflow rate (gross 
job outflow rate) is negatively (positively) correlated with change in unemployment rate. Finally, 
there is a positive and significant correlation between gross job inflow rate and gross job outflow 
                                                            
5 Lilien (1982) and Davis (1987) argue that unemployment is, in part, the result of worker turnover from declining to 
expanding sectors of the economy. Due to labor reallocation frictions related to job search, retraining, or physical 
relocation, changing jobs takes time, which leads to higher unemployment in the interim. High performance dispersion 
implies that some firms lay off employees while others recruit new workers. 
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rate, suggesting that periods of increased job inflows and outflows occur simultaneously and are 
therefore indicative of overall job redistributions in the economy.  
 
4. The Information Content of Cost Behavior Components  
4.1 Persistence over time 
We begin by estimating the persistence of both beta coefficients, βSU and βSD, using AR(1) 
regressions of the coefficient on its lagged value. As both coefficients capture aggregate 
persistence, we expect the AR(1) coefficient to be statistically significant and close to 1. Yet, we 
expect the persistence of βSU to be higher than the persistence of βSD for the following reasons: 
First, a reduction in sales is likely to be temporary. Hence, the composition of firms experiencing 
such a decline is likely to change considerably form one quarter to the next, affecting the 
intertemporal variation of βSD. Second, the decision to reduce committed resources when sales 
decrease, reflected in βSD, is typically made after observing demand realization, and hence is likely 
to vary more over time compared with the decisions reflected in βSU, which are more long-run in 
nature, and reflect decisions such as capacity and choice of production technology.  
Table 2 presents the results. Column I shows the estimation of βSU’s persistence. The 
magnitude of the coefficient is 0.99 and it is highly statistically significant. Column II shows that 
the persistence of βSD is 0.93, and it is also statistically significant. The difference in coefficients 





4.2 OLS Regressions 
4.2.1 Contemporaneous Gross Job Inflow Rate 
Next, we run OLS regressions of job inflows on the two beta coefficients, βSU and βSD. We 
include a battery of control variables. Additionally, because the beta coefficients are standardized, 
the interpretation of their incremental explanatory power is straightforward. We estimate three 
OLS regressions, nested in the following model: 
 Job flow rate = α1 + α2k βSU + α3k βSD + α Controls + ε, (2) 
where βSU and  βSD  are estimated in the current quarter q using data from public filings by listed 
U.S. firms with fiscal quarters ending in [q-3, q].6 Job flow rate is either gross job inflow rate or 
gross job outflow rate. We apply the Newey-West procedure in order to obtain consistent standard 
errors in the presence of autocorrelation. We use a truncation parameter (or lag) of 3.7 
Table 3, Column I, presents the results of a regression of the gross job inflow rate on βSU 
and control variables. Consistent with our prediction, we obtain a positive association between βSU 
and the contemporaneous gross job inflow rate. The coefficient is both economically and 
statistically significant. A one-standard-deviation-higher βSU is associated with an increase of 38 
basis points in the gross job inflow rate (the dependent variable, measured in percentage points). 
This effect is economically significant, given that the model includes all the control variables and 
the mean gross job inflow rate during the sample period is 7.11%. 
We include a battery of control variables, known to explain the change in the level of 
unemployment (Rouxelin, Wongsunwai, and Yehuda 2018). These coefficients generally enter the 
                                                            
6 We use quarterly data from quarter t-3 to quarter t to address potential complications due to seasonality, which affects 
many businesses. In robustness tests, we only use quarterly data in quarter t and our conclusions remain unchanged. 
7 The choice of 3 lags is based on the usual rule of thumb: T0.25, where T is the number of observations. In our sample 
of 100 quarterly observations, this suggests a truncation parameter of 3. In robustness tests, we allow for different lag 
lengths and our conclusions remain unchanged. 
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regression with their expected sign. For example, the coefficients on GDP is positive and 
significant, consistent with Okun’s law.8 The coefficient on MktRet is negative and significant, 
contrary to our expectation, possibly as a result of the correlation between this variable and the 
other variables capturing the state of the overall economy (GDP, Earn, ∆Earn). The coefficient on 
IPI is negative and significant, consistent with greater uncertainty reducing future job inflows. CSI 
loads positively, confirming the positive relation between job inflows and consumer sentiment. 
Ret_Disp is strongly positive, consistent with labor reallocation frictions resulting in greater 
movement in the labor market.  
In Column II, we estimate the regression with βSD and control variables as the independent 
variables. The coefficient on βSD is not significant at conventional levels, suggesting that there is 
no relationship between βSD and the gross job inflow rate, consistent with the hypothesized 
information content of this coefficient.  
Colum III presents the results of a regression which includes both beta coefficients. We 
find that βSD loads positively, while βSD loads negatively. Conditional on the inclusion of βSD, GDP 
growth, and other macroeconomic indicators, a higher βSU indicates more job inflows, because of 
the greater elasticity of the cost function. Conditional on the inclusion of βSU and macroeconomic 
indicators, a larger βSD indicates less job inflows due to the higher level of adjustment costs to 
reduce or restore committed resources that affect both contraction and expansion. 
Both coefficients are larger in magnitude compared to the regressions in the first two 
columns, in which they are included individually, indicating that the inclusion of both coefficients 
increases both their economic and statistical significance. For example, the coefficient on βSU is 
almost twice as large as its magnitude in Column I: conditional on βSD, a one-standard-deviation-
                                                            
8 Okun (1963) documents a negative relation between unemployment and real GDP growth. In Table 3, we examine 
job inflows, which are positively related to real GDP growth.  
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higher βSU is associated with an increase of 63 basis points in the gross job inflow rate, compared 
with an increase of 38 basis points documented in Column I.  
Finally, the coefficient on βSU is larger than the coefficient on βSD. This finding is consistent 
with the greater explanatory power of βSU. Moreover, βSU is more persistent than βSD because the 
relative difficulty in adjusting the elasticity of costs with respect to sales increases at the firm level 
and at the economy level.  
Overall, the results in Table 3 lend strong support to the different information content of 
βSU and βSD. 
 
4.2.2 Contemporaneous Gross Job Outflow Rate 
Table 4 repeats the analysis for the gross job outflow rate. Column I shows the results of a 
regression of the contemporaneous gross job outflow rate on βSU and control variables. The 
coefficient of βSU is not significant at conventional levels, suggesting that βSU by itself does not 
explain the gross job outflow rate. This finding is consistent with aggregate-level cost stickiness— 
that is, for a given growth in GDP, firms are not likely to cut jobs at the level predicted by βSU (in 
absolute value) because of adjustment costs and managerial discretion.  
In Column II, we examine the information content of βSD. The coefficient of βSD is negative 
and significant, indicating that higher cost stickiness is associated with lower job outflows. The 
coefficient is also economically large. Conditional on GDP growth and other macroeconomic 
indicators, a one-standard-deviation-higher βSD is associated with a decrease of 19 basis points in 
the gross job outflow rate. This effect is economically significant, given that the model includes 
all the control variables and the mean gross job outflow rate during the sample period is 6.79%. 
As before, we include a battery of control variables, known to explain the change in the 
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level of unemployment. These coefficients generally enter the regression with their expected sign. 
For example, the coefficients on Earn, ∆Earn and MktRet are negative and significant, indicating 
a negative relation between the state of the economy and job outflows, as we would expect. The 
coefficients on EPU and IPI are negative and significant, suggesting that in periods of high 
uncertainty, job outflows are smaller. We explore this issue in detail in section 4.3.  
Unemployment insurance claims (UIC) is positively related to job outflows. Finally, the 
positive coefficient obtained for IR indicates a rise in unemployment following an interest-rate 
increase. 
In Column III, we include both elasticities βSU and βSD. The coefficient on each of the 
elasticities is larger compared with Column I and II. Moreover, both coefficients are statistically 
significant. However, while βSU is positively related to the gross job outflow rate, βSD is negatively 
related to job outflows. Conditional on the inclusion of βSD, GDP growth, and other 
macroeconomic indicators, a higher βSU indicates a more elastic cost structure and hence more job 
outflows. Conditional on the inclusion of βSU and macroeconomic indicators, a larger βSD indicates 
less job outflows due to cost stickiness, which implies a lower decline in resources when sales 
decline, compared to the situation in which sales increase by an equivalent amount. As in 
Column III of Table 2, the coefficient on βSU is larger than the coefficient on βSD consistent with 
higher persistence and greater explanatory power of βSU compared with βSD. 
 
4.2.3 Future Gross Job Outflow and Inflow Rates 
In Table 5, we present the prediction analysis. Panel A shows results for predicting the job 
inflow rate in the subsequent four quarters. The control variables are included in the regressions 
but are not tabulated for parsimony. The evidence in Column I indicates that the coefficient on βSU 
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is positive and significant at all horizons. This coefficient increases monotonically in quarters t+1 
to t+3, and decreases in quarter t+4. The coefficient on βSU is also economically large. Conditional 
on GDP growth and other macroeconomic indicators, a one-standard-deviation-higher βSU is 
associated with an increase of 33 basis points in the gross job inflow rate in the next quarter, 36 
basis points two quarters ahead and 37 basis points three quarters ahead.  
Column II confirms that βSD is not a predictor of gross job inflows at any prediction 
horizon, consistent with the results in Table 3. Column III shows results using both elasticities. 
The coefficients on both βSU and βSD are economically and statistically significant. Moreover, 
consistent with Panel A, βSU loads positively, while βSD loads negatively. The coefficient on βSU, 
conditional on the inclusion of βSD in the regression, is larger compared to Column I. Furthermore, 
the coefficient on βSU is always larger than the coefficient on βSD. This finding is consistent with 
the short-term nature of the information in the elasticity of costs with respect to sales decreases. 
In Panel B, we explore the prediction of job outflow rates. Column I confirms the findings 
in Table 4 and indicates that βSU does not predict gross job outflow rates. Column II indicates that 
βSD predicts future job outflows at all horizons examined. The coefficient on βSD decreases 
monotonically in quarters t+1 to t+3, and then increases. In Column III, when both coefficients are 
included in the regression, both load significantly, but with opposite signs at all horizons except 
for quarter t+4, when only the coefficient on βSD is statistically significant at conventional levels.  
Collectively, Tables 3 to 5 document the different information content of the aggregate-
level elasticities of costs relative to sales increases vs. decreases. Moreover, when both are 
included in the same regression, these elasticities have an economically large explanatory power. 
The explanatory power of the elasticity of costs with respect to sales increase is larger than the 
elasticity with respect to sales decreases.  
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4.3 Standard Error of βSD 
Having studied the explanatory power of both the βSU and βSD coefficients, we next examine 
whether the explanatory power is greater in periods of high uncertainty. We use the second moment 
of the estimated βSD coefficient—that is, the standard error, SE(βSD)—as a measure of the level of 
uncertainty.  
A higher standard error of βSD implies: (a) a less precise βSD coefficient; and (b) a higher 
dispersion in the level of resource retention across firms, reflecting different expectations about 
future macroeconomic conditions. Under explanation (a), we expect a positive and significant 
interaction between βSD and its standard error, consistent with less pronounced effect of βSD on job 
outflows when the estimation of βSD is less precise. Under (b), we expect a negative and significant 
interaction term, indicating that the impact of βSD on job outflows is more pronounced in periods 
of high uncertainty.  
Figure 1 depicts SE(βSD) and the BBD Economic Policy Uncertainty Index. SE(βSD) peaks 
during recessions, then declines when recovery occurs. 
In Table 6, we regress gross job outflow rate on βSD, SE(βSD), and their interaction. 
SE(βSD)—top decile (quartile) is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if SE(βSD) is in the 
highest decile (quartile) and 0 otherwise. As before, the coefficient on βSD is negative and 
significant, suggesting that the higher βSD, the higher is the employee retention by firms, and hence 
the lower are job outflows. The coefficient of SE(βSD), the standard error of βSD, is also negative 
and significant, consistent with a greater standard-error corresponding to a higher level of 
uncertainty. 
The interaction term between βSD and SE(βSD) quantile is negative and significant, 
suggesting that the relationship between βSD and job outflows is stronger when there is greater 
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uncertainty. The results in column I show that, in quarters with high uncertainty (standard error of 
βSD is in the highest decile), a one-standard-deviation-higher βSD is associated with a decrease of 
46.5 (-0.217 – 0.248) basis points in the gross job outflow rate (the dependent variable, measured 
in percentage points). Column II shows similar results when using quartiles of SE(βSD) to construct 
the dummy variable.  
 
4.4 Comparing the Symmetric and Asymmetric Cost Behavior Models 
In Table 7, we compare the asymmetric cost model, introduced to the literature by ABJ 
(2003), to a symmetric cost model, which assumes the same response of costs (in absolute value 
terms) to a 1 percent increase or decrease in sales. We run the following seasonally-adjusted 
quarterly regression: 
 log ቂ ሺ஼ைீௌାௌீ&஺ሻ௟௔௚ሺ஼ைீௌାௌீ&஺ሻቃ ൌ 𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଷ log ቂ
ௌ஺௅ாௌ
௟௔௚ሺௌ஺௅ாௌሻቃ ൅ 𝜀  (3) 
We label the standardized β3 coefficient from this regression βSYM. 
Table 7 compares the explanatory power of βSYM to the explanatory power of both βSU and 
βSD for different job flow rates. Specifically, we compare the difference in adjusted R-squared 
between the two classes of models, and present Vuong (1989) Z-statistics to indicate whether this 
difference is statistically significant. 
In Columns I and II we compare the two models’ performance in explaining the gross job 
inflow rate. The coefficient of βSYM in column II loads positively and significantly, suggesting that 
a higher βSYM, conditional on GDP growth and other macroeconomic indicators, is associated with 
a greater job inflow rate. We do not find any difference between the adjusted R-squared of the 
symmetric and asymmetric models.  
Columns III and IV repeat the analysis for gross job outflow rate. In this case, the 
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coefficient of βSYM is also positive and statistically significant, suggesting that a higher βSYM, 
conditional on GDP growth and other macroeconomic indicators, is associated with a greater job 
outflow rate. Yet, the adjusted R-squared of the symmetric model is lower than the adjusted R-
squared of a model that includes both βSU and βSD, suggesting that the asymmetry of cost behavior 
is important in predicting gross job outflows. The difference in the adjusted R-squared between 
the two models is highly statistically significant (1.2% level).  
Finally, Columns V and VI repeat the analysis for explaining the net job outflow rate. As 
was the case for gross job outflows, we find that the adjusted R-squared of the symmetric model 
is lower than the adjusted R-squared of the asymmetric model. This difference is statistically 
significant with a p-value of 2.3%.  
Overall, the findings in Table 7 provide strong support for the importance of the 
asymmetric cost model in explaining job outflows. Using both βSU and βSD explains a greater 
proportion of job outflow variation compared with βSYM. 
  
5. Vector Autoregression (VAR) Analysis  
We augment the OLS regression analysis with reduced-form vector autoregression (VAR) 
models corresponding to the six regressions in Tables 3 and 4. The VAR models build on Okun’s 
law, which predicts a negative relationship between unemployment and real GDP growth. We 
decompose the unemployment rate into the gross job inflow rate and the gross job outflow rate, 
and add the variables of interest — that is, βSU, and βSD. We use four lags. We add βSU, and βSD to 
the VAR individually as well as jointly. We estimate different VAR models as follows:  
 AZt = ϕZt–k + εt, (4)
where 𝑍௧ ൌ ൫𝐽𝑜𝑏 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒௧, 𝐺𝐷𝑃௧,  𝛽ௌ௎,௧,  𝛽ௌ஽,௧൯ᇱ is a vector of variables that includes (in this 
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order) job-flow rate, real GDP growth rate (GDP), βSU, and/or βSD. 
In Panel A of Table 8, we consider the gross job inflow rate, modeled using two separate 
VAR systems. The fist system includes βSU and the second includes βSD.  
We present two orthogonalized impulse-response graphs. The first graph depicts the impact 
of an exogenous shock to βSU on the gross job inflow rate. A one-standard-deviation shock to βSU 
leads to an increase in the gross job inflow rate of 7 basis points. The shock persists (i.e., is reliably 
positive within a 95% confidence band) for up to 4 quarters. The second graph depicts the impact 
of an exogenous shock to βSD on the gross job inflow rate. We find that βSD has no significant 
impact on the gross job inflow rate. 
In Panel B we consider a VAR system that includes both coefficients (i.e., βSU and βSD). 
The first graph indicates that a one-standard-deviation shock to βSU leads to an increase in the gross 
job inflow rate of 8 basis points. The shock persists for up to 4 quarters. At the same time, as 
indicated in the second graph of panel B, a one-standard-deviation shock to βSD leads to a reduction 
in gross job inflow rate of 5 basis points. This shock lasts for 2 quarters and then dissipates.  
Overall, the findings in Table 8 are consistent with the findings in Table 3 and provide 
strong support for the different information content of βSU and βSD in explaining the gross job 
inflow rate.  
In Table 9, we repeat the analysis in Table 8, with future gross job outflow rate as the job 
flow variable in the VAR model. In Panel A, we consider the gross job outflow rate, modeled using 
two separate VAR systems, including βSU and βSD, respectively, while in Panel B, we include both 
variables in the same system.   
The first graph in Table 9, panel A shows that there is no significant relationship between 
βSU and gross job outflow rate. In the second graph, a one-standard-deviation exogenous shock to 
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βSD leads to a decrease in the gross job outflow rate of 5 basis points, which lasts up to 2 quarters. 
In Panel B, a one-standard-deviation shock to βSU leads to a 7 basis points increase in gross job 
outflow rate, which persists for up to 3 quarters. At the same time, a one-standard-deviation shock 
to βSD leads to a reduction in gross job outflow rate of 6 basis points, lasting for up to 2 quarters.  
Overall, the findings in Table 9 are consistent with the findings in Table 4 and provide 
strong support for the different information content of βSU and βSD in explaining the gross job 
outflow rate. Moreover, the impact of βSU and βSD on the gross job outflow rate is less persistent 
than the impact of these coefficients on the gross job inflow rate.  
 
6. Aggregate Cost Behavior, Job Flow Rates and The Adoption of Wrongful-Discharge 
Laws (WDLs) 
Next, we compare the explanatory power of βSU and βSD in different states. In particular, 
we classify states according to the adoption of Wrongful Discharge Laws (WDLs). The U.S. has 
long had a legal presumption that workers can be dismissed at will—that is for any reason 
(without having to establish “just cause” for termination), and without warning. Since the 1970s, 
the vast majority of U.S. states have adopted common law exceptions to the employment-at-will 
doctrine. 9 These exceptions are part of the common law, that is, law created by court decisions 
(in this case, state courts). We refer to these common-law exceptions as wrongful-discharge laws 
(hereinafter WDLs). The exceptions are:  
(1) The public policy exception, which provides workers with protections against 
discharges that would inhibit them from acting in accordance with public policy, such as 
performing jury duty, filing a worker’s compensation claim, reporting an employer’s 
                                                            
9 See Walsh and Schwarz (1996), Autor (2003), Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006), Littler (2009) and Serfling (2016) for 
detailed discussion.  
26 
 
wrongdoing, or refusing to commit perjury.  
(2) The good faith exception, which forbids employers from firing workers for ‘bad 
cause.’  
(3) The implied contract exception, which becomes effective when an employer implicitly 
promises not to terminate a worker without good cause.  
WDLs impose substantial firing costs on employers and hence increase the level of labor 
adjustment costs. We employ the state-level BED data and estimate the gross job inflow and 
outflow rates in states that adopted WDLs and states that did not. In determining the dates in 
which each state has passed each of the above exceptions, we follow Serfling (2016).  
We test the ability of aggregate-level βSU and βSD to explain the job flows in the two types 
of states. We expect that the ability of βSU to explain gross job inflow rates is greater in states that 
did not adopt the WDLs, as firms in states with WDLs are more likely to consider the potential 
firing costs and hence, for a given growth rate in GDP, limit the number of newly-hired 
employees, compared with the number implied by βSU. In contrast, we expect that the ability of 
βSD to explain gross job outflow rates is greater in states that adopted these laws. In these states, 
employers are more likely to retain more employees, due to the larger firing costs.10 
Table 10 reports the results. Panel A compares the ability of βSU to explain the gross job 
inflow rates in states that adopted (Column I) and did not adopt (Column II) the WDLs. We find 
that the coefficient of βSU is larger in states that did not adopt these laws, in line with our 
                                                            
10 We expect that WDLs are likely to affect the calculation of βSU and βSD of firms that reside in states that did and did not 
adopt these laws. To avoid this potential circularity, we use the elasticities estimated for the entire sample as the independent 
variables in our analysis.  
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expectations. The difference in βSU coefficients between the two types of states is statistically 
significant at the 6% level.  
In Panel B, we conduct a parallel analysis comparing the ability of βSD to explain gross job 
outflow rates between the two types of states. Confirming our expectations, we find that the 
coefficient of βSD is larger in states that adopted these laws (Column I) compared with sates that 
did not (Column II). The difference is statistically significant at the 6% level. 
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
A growing body of literature, beginning with ABJ (2003), studies cost behavior and 
assumes a non-symmetric relation between costs and activities: costs increase more when activity 
rises than they decrease when activity falls by an equivalent amount. We examine the information 
content of the two aggregate-level elasticities of costs with respect to sales in firms’ asymmetric 
cost function. Both aggregate-level coefficients are highly persistent. Additionally, Consistent 
with our expectations, we find that the persistence of the aggregate elasticity of costs is higher for 
sales increases (βSU) than for sales decreases (βSD).  
Next, we examine information content with respect to the labor market, using the Business 
Employment Dynamics (BED) quarterly data on job flows. These data were recently made 
publicly available by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). We find that, conditional on the growth 
in GDP and other macroeconomic indicators, the aggregate elasticity of costs with respect to sales 
increases (βSU) explains the gross job inflow rate, but not the gross job outflow rate. Conversely, 
the aggregate elasticity of costs with respect to sales decreases (βSD) explains the gross job outflow 
rate, but not the gross job inflow rate. When we include both elasticities in the regression, both are 
significant, but with opposite signs. Moreover, both economic and statistical significance increase 
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in the combined model. We repeat the analysis using vector autoregression (VAR) models and 
document similar results. 
Next, we examine whether the explanatory power of the elasticity of costs with respect to 
a decrease in sales (βSD) is greater in periods of high uncertainty. We measure the level of 
uncertainty using the standard error of the estimated βSD coefficient (SE(βSD)). The higher this 
standard error, the less precise is βSD and the higher is the dispersion among different firms in their 
level of resource retention, reflecting different opinions about future macroeconomic conditions. 
We find that, conditional on the level of βSD, a higher standard error of βSD is associated with a 
lower gross job outflow rate, indicating greater employee retention in periods of high uncertainty.  
Finally, we compare the model assuming asymmetric cost behavior (i.e., sticky costs) to a 
traditional model that assumes symmetry. To do so, we estimate the time series of βSYM, which 
assumes a symmetric relation between the change in costs and the change in sales. Our findings 
indicate that, conditional on macroeconomic indicators and for a given level of GDP growth, a 
larger βSYM is associated with both greater job outflows and job inflows. Moreover, the explanatory 
power of a model that includes βSYM is lower than the explanatory power of a model that includes 
both βSD and βSU, when explaining the gross job outflow rate, but not the gross job inflow rate, 
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Definitions of key variables 
β1 and β2 coefficient estimates 
Estimated coefficients obtained from running the following 
ordinary least squares regression cross-sectionally each 
quarter q using Compustat quarterly data for quarters  
[q–3, q]: 
log ቈ ሺ𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 ൅ 𝑆𝐺&𝐴ሻ𝑙𝑎𝑔ሺ𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 ൅ 𝑆𝐺&𝐴ሻ቉
ൌ 𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵ log ൤ 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑔ሺ𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆ሻ൨
൅ 𝛽ଶ𝐼_𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 ൈ log ൤ 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑔ሺ𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆ሻ൨ ൅ 𝜀 
β3 coefficient estimates 
Estimated coefficients obtained from running the following 
ordinary least squares regression cross-sectionally each 
quarter q using Compustat quarterly data for quarters  
[q–3, q]: 
log ቈ ሺ𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 ൅ 𝑆𝐺&𝐴ሻ𝑙𝑎𝑔ሺ𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 ൅ 𝑆𝐺&𝐴ሻ቉ ൌ 𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵ log ൤
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆
𝑙𝑎𝑔ሺ𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆ሻ൨ ൅ 𝜀 
βSU  β1 coefficient estimates, standardized by subtracting sample mean and dividing by standard deviation. 
βSD  β2 coefficient estimates × –1, standardized by subtracting sample mean and dividing by standard deviation. 
βSYM  β3 coefficient estimates, normalized by subtracting its sample mean and dividing by standard deviation. 
Gross job inflow/outflow rate 
Gross job inflow or outflow for the total private sector in the 
U.S. as a percentage of total employment in this sector, 
retrieved from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Net job outflow rate Gross job outflow rate minus gross job inflow rate. 
Real GDP growth rate (GDP) Real GDP growth rate.
Aggregate earnings (Earn) 
Value-weighted average earnings (scaled by 
contemporaneous sales) in each quarter, with weights based 
on market capitalization as of the beginning of the quarter. 
Aggregate GAAP earnings each quarter are the cross-
sectional value-weighted averages of earnings (scaled by 
contemporaneous sales), following the procedure described in 
Konchitchki and Patatoukas (2014).
Market return (MktRet) Equal-weighted average quarterly market return for the stocks in the sample. 
Industrial production index 
(IPI) 
Industrial production index from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis.
BBD Economic Policy 
Uncertainty (EPU) index 
Economic policy uncertainty index obtained from 
www.policyuncertainty.com and based on Baker, Bloom, and 
Davis (2014). This index is constructed from three underlying 
components—disagreement among economic forecasters, the 
number of federal-tax-code provisions set to expire in future 




Consumer Sentiment Index 
(CSI) 
Index of consumer sentiment based on surveys of consumers 
by the University of Michigan. This index is constructed from 
a national representative survey based on telephonic 
household interviews and captures short-term consumer 
attitudes about the business climate, spending, and personal 
finance.
4-week average of 
unemployment insurance 
weekly claims (UIC) 
4-week average of unemployment insurance weekly claims 
released by the U.S. Department of Labor Employment & 
Training Administration.
Help-Wanted Index (HWI) 
Composite Help-Wanted Index, captures the job opening rate, 
which equals the number of job openings or vacancies 
divided by the size of the labor force.
Employment growth 
dispersion (EmpG_Disp) 
Sector-level employment growth dispersion available in 
quarter t, measured as residual from an AR(2) model:  
AggEmpGDispt = r0 + r1 AggEmpGDispt–1 + 
r2 AggEmpGDispt–2 + et, 
where AggEmpGDispt–k is aggregate employment growth 
dispersion estimate for quarter t–k. (See Nallareddy and 
Ogneva 2017).
Stock return dispersion  
(Ret_Disp) 
Stock return dispersion available in quarter t, measured as the 
residual from an AR(2) model:  
AggRetDispt = r0 + r1 AggRetDispt–1 + 
r2 AggRetDispt–2 + et, 
where AggRetDispt–k is aggregate stock return dispersion 
estimate for quarter t–k.
Effective Federal Funds rate 
(IR) 
Federal funds rate released by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York.









Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
 Mean Median SD 
Gross job inflow rate % 7.107 7.000 0.823 
Gross job outflow rate % 6.790 6.800 0.746 
Net job outflow rate % -0.317 -0.400 0.597 
β1 coefficient estimates 0.410 0.385 0.108 
β2 coefficient estimates -0.053 -0.064 0.088 
β3 coefficient estimates 0.392 0.375 0.089 
GDP 2.531 2.612 1.952 
Earn 0.072 0.082 0.041 
∆Earn -0.101 -0.061 0.220 
MktRet 0.029 0.031 0.125 
IPI 92.290 95.217 11.333 
EPU 106.053 97.855 31.722 
CSI 87.491 90.000 12.264 
UIC 0.357 0.340 0.071 
IR 2.673 2.302 2.264 
Inf 1.920 1.950 0.840 
HWI 2.797 2.827 0.599 
EmpG_Disp -0.083 -0.136 0.289 
Ret_Disp 0.019 0.009 0.080 
 
Panel B: Pairwise Pearson correlations – job flow rates and unemployment rate change  
  
ChUR 
Net job outflow  
rate 
Gross job inflow 
rate 
Gross job outflow 
rate 
ChUR 1 
Net job outflow rate 0.816*** 1
Gross job inflow rate -0.226** -0.486*** 1
Gross job outflow rate 0.404*** 0.265*** 0.714*** 1
 
Table shows descriptive statistics for the main variables. The sample consists of 100 calendar quarterly observations 
ranging from Q3:1992 to Q2:2017. Composite Help-Wanted Index is available until Q4:2016, we use the latest 
updated value of the index for Q1:2017 and Q2:2017. Panel A shows summary statistics for the main variables. 
Panel B shows pairwise correlations between the BED job flow rates and the change in the traditional unemployment 
rate (ChUR), which is based on the Current Population Survey. Variables are as defined in Appendix A. ***, **, and 
* indicate two-tailed statistical significance at levels 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   
35 
 
Table 2. The persistence of aggregate cost behavior 
  I II 
 βSU t+1 βSD t+1 
  
βSU t 0.990***  
 (53.008)  βSD t 0.931*** 
 (18.811) 
Intercept ‐0.022 0.001 
 (‐1.064) (0.020) Adjusted R-squared 0.973 0.864 
Observations 100 100 
Suest chi2-statistic (I) vs (II): 3.65** 
[0.056](p-value) 
 
Table reports the results of OLS regressions of aggregate cost behavior components on its own lags. We compare the 
statistical difference in the magnitude of βSU and βSD at the bottom of the table. Variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
t-statistics shown in parentheses underneath the estimated coefficients are based on Newey and West (1987) 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors with three lags. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed 
statistical significance at levels 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 3. Association between aggregate cost behavior and the gross job inflow rate--
Contemporaneous relationship 
  I II III 
 Gross job inflow rate Gross job inflow rate Gross job inflow rate 
   
βSU 0.380*** 0.634***
 (3.849) (8.112)βSD  0.021 -0.184***
  (0.423) (-3.959)
GDP 0.065*** 0.083*** 0.054***
 (3.413) (3.638) (2.854)
Earn 0.775 0.653 0.800 
 (0.754) (0.691) (0.944)∆Earn -0.160 -0.199 -0.160
 (-0.837) (-1.104) (-0.933)
MktRet -0.689* -0.878** -0.386*
 (-1.922) (-2.329) (-1.723)
IPI -0.020*** -0.037*** -0.014***
 (-4.169) (-10.448) (-3.465)
EPU 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.387) (0.387) (0.468)
CSI 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.007*
 (2.894) (4.648) (1.881)
UIC 1.554** 0.807 0.002 
 (2.239) (0.892) (0.003)
HWI 0.104 0.071 0.085 
 (1.113) (0.574) (0.916)
EmpG_Disp -0.104 -0.127 -0.062
 (-1.305) (-1.167) (-0.821)
Ret_Disp 1.244*** 1.544*** 0.812**
 (2.945) (3.589) (2.322)
IR 0.035* 0.093*** 0.022 
 (1.667) (3.804) (1.205)
Inf 0.069** 0.082** 0.084***
 (2.031) (2.134) (2.705)
Intercept 6.382*** 7.410*** 7.034***
 (9.576) (9.815) (8.997)Adjusted R-squared 0.924 0.904 0.935 
Observations 100 100 100 
 
Table reports the results of OLS regressions of gross job inflow rate on βSU and βSD estimated in the current quarter q, 
using public firms’ accounting data from quarter [q-3, q]. Variables are as defined in Appendix A. t-statistics shown 
in parentheses underneath the estimated coefficients are based on Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation-consistent standard errors with three lags. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 
levels 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4. Association between aggregate cost behavior and the gross job outflow rate--
Contemporaneous relationship 
  I II III 
 Gross job outflow rate Gross job outflow rate Gross job outflow rate 
   
βSU -0.083 0.316***
 (-0.752) (2.774)βSD  -0.187*** -0.289***
  (-3.971) (-4.583)
GDP -0.021 -0.023 -0.037*
 (-0.955) (-1.145) (-1.750)
Earn -3.153** -3.187*** -3.114***
 (-2.294) (-2.843) (-2.776)∆Earn -0.348** -0.367*** -0.348**
 (-2.029) (-2.720) (-2.527)
MktRet -0.937** -0.705* -0.460
 (-2.068) (-1.920) (-1.429)
IPI -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.015**
 (-4.564) (-6.992) (-2.564)
EPU -0.003* -0.003* -0.003*
 (-1.830) (-1.978) (-1.915)
CSI 0.016* 0.012* 0.005 
 (1.779) (1.678) (0.683)
UIC 5.908*** 3.869*** 3.468***
 (5.675) (3.810) (3.379)
HWI 0.084 0.047 0.054 
 (0.635) (0.363) (0.394)
EmpG_Disp 0.115 0.148 0.181 
 (0.797) (1.018) (1.170)
Ret_Disp 1.166 0.851 0.486 
 (1.500) (1.292) (0.838)
IR 0.147*** 0.161*** 0.126***
 (7.138) (7.323) (5.862)
Inf 0.073 0.095** 0.096**
 (1.448) (2.147) (2.167)
Intercept 5.325*** 6.537*** 6.350***
 (4.880) (5.910) (5.628)Adjusted R-squared 0.842 0.866 0.874 
Observations 100 100 100 
 
Table reports the results of OLS regressions of gross job outflow rate on βSU and βSD estimated in the current quarter 
q, using public firms’ accounting data from quarter [q-3, q]. Variables are as defined in Appendix A. t-statistics shown 
in parentheses underneath the estimated coefficients are based on Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation-consistent standard errors with three lags. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed statistical significance at 




Table 5. Association between aggregate cost behavior and future gross job flow rate--Prediction 
Panel A: Association between βSU, βSD and future gross job inflow rates 
  I II III
 Gross job inflow ratet+k Gross job inflow ratet+k Gross job inflow ratet+k 
 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
                 
βSU 0.327*** 0.357*** 0.372*** 0.328*** 0.593*** 0.653*** 0.706*** 0.621***
 (3.953) (3.341) (3.039) (2.666) (7.101) (7.349) (7.005) (6.469)
βSD   0.009 0.009 0.001 0.001 -0.170*** -0.189*** -0.213*** -0.187***
   (0.233) (0.193) (0.011) (0.012) (-4.077) (-3.986) (-3.839) (-3.454)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.919 0.914 0.910 0.912 0.906 0.898 0.893 0.899 0.928 0.925 0.924 0.923
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
 
 
Panel B: Association between βSU, βSD and future gross job outflow rates 
  I II III
 Gross job outflow ratet+k Gross job outflow ratet+k Gross job outflow ratet+k 
 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
                 
βSU -0.042 -0.058 -0.044 -0.177  0.494*** 0.394* 0.414* 0.252
 (-0.273) (-0.425) (-0.362) (-1.393)  (3.307) (1.837) (1.910) (1.573)
βSD   -0.193*** -0.169*** -0.167** -0.198** -0.342*** -0.288*** -0.293** -0.274**
   (-3.694) (-3.009) (-2.493) (-2.619) (-4.595) (-2.728) (-2.437) (-2.488)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.809 0.801 0.783 0.811 0.839 0.823 0.804 0.836 0.856 0.833 0.816 0.839
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
 
Table reports the results of OLS regressions of future gross job flow rate on βSU and βSD estimated in the current quarter q, using public firms’ accounting data from quarter 
[q-3, q]. Panel A reports the results of OLS regressions of future gross job inflow rate on βSU and βSD up to 4 quarters. Panel B reports the results of OLS regressions of 
future gross job outflow rate on βSU and βSD up to 4 quarters. Variables are as defined in Appendix A. t-statistics shown in parentheses underneath the estimated coefficients 
are based on Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors with three lags. ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed statistical 
significance at levels 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
39 
 
Figure 1. Standard errors of βSD and the Economic Policy Uncertainty index 
  
Figure shows BBD Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (in solid line) and standard errors of βSD (in dash line) for 










































1993q1 1998q1 2003q1 2008q1 2013q1 2018q1
40 
 
Table 6. Association between βSD, standard error of βSD, and gross job outflow rate 
 I II 
  Gross job outflow rate Gross job outflow rate
  
βSD -0.217*** -0.208***
 (-4.764) (-5.683)SE(βSD)—top decile -0.329**  
 (-1.997)  βSD × SE(βSD)—top decile -0.248**  
 (-2.430)  SE(βSD)—top quartile -0.295***




























 (6.342) (7.335)Adjusted R-squared 0.873 0.880
Observations 100 100
 
Table reports the results of OLS regressions of job outflow rates on βSD, the standard error of βSD, their interactions, 
and control variables. βSD is estimated for each quarter q using public firms’ accounting data from quarters [q-3, q]. 
SE(βSD)—top decile (quartile) is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if SE(βSD) is in the highest decile (quartile) 
and 0 otherwise. Other variables are as defined in Appendix A. t-statistics shown in parentheses underneath the 
estimated coefficients are based on Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard 




Table 7. A comparison of the symmetric and asymmetric cost models 




















          
βSU 0.634*** 0.316*** -0.318** 
 (8.112) (2.774) (-2.488) βSD -0.184*** -0.289*** -0.105* 
 (-3.959) (-4.583) (-1.726) βSYM  0.551*** 0.285**  -0.267*
  (7.989) (2.259)  (-1.872)
GDP 0.054*** 0.053*** -0.037* -0.041* -0.091*** -0.093***
 (2.854) (2.777) (-1.750) (-1.893) (-3.731) (-3.601)
Earn 0.800 0.940 -3.114*** -2.973** -3.914*** -3.914***
 (0.944) (1.114) (-2.776) (-2.078) (-4.170) (-3.631)∆Earn -0.160 -0.186 -0.348** -0.331* -0.188 -0.145
 (-0.933) (-1.116) (-2.527) (-1.857) (-1.325) (-0.953)
MktRet -0.386* -0.313 -0.460 -0.620 -0.074 -0.307
 (-1.723) (-1.461) (-1.429) (-1.607) (-0.203) (-0.787)
IPI -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.015** -0.009 -0.001 0.005
 (-3.465) (-3.451) (-2.564) (-1.434) (-0.163) (0.684)
EPU 0.001 0.001 -0.003* -0.003 -0.003* -0.003*
 (0.468) (0.553) (-1.915) (-1.627) (-1.946) (-1.723)
CSI 0.007* 0.006 0.005 0.007 -0.002 0.001
 (1.881) (1.474) (0.683) (0.752) (-0.279) (0.158)
UIC 0.002 -0.556 3.468*** 5.551*** 3.466*** 6.108***
 (0.003) (-0.789) (3.379) (4.886) (3.128) (5.388)
HWI 0.085 0.081 0.054 0.100 -0.032 0.019
 (0.916) (0.845) (0.394) (0.667) (-0.255) (0.135)
EmpG_Disp -0.062 -0.049 0.181 0.157 0.242 0.207
 (-0.821) (-0.660) (1.170) (0.966) (1.439) (1.152)
Ret_Disp 0.812** 0.746** 0.486 0.709 -0.326 -0.037
 (2.322) (2.029) (0.838) (1.075) (-0.504) (-0.048)
IR 0.022 0.017 0.126*** 0.092*** 0.104*** 0.075***
 (1.205) (0.978) (5.862) (3.254) (4.492) (2.989)
Inf 0.084*** 0.091*** 0.096** 0.072 0.012 -0.019
 (2.705) (2.839) (2.167) (1.434) (0.288) (-0.379)
Intercept 7.034*** 7.307*** 6.350*** 4.927*** -0.684 -2.380**
 (8.997) (10.608) (5.628) (4.355) (-0.708) (-2.274)Adjusted R-squared 0.935 0.935 0.874 0.851 0.742 0.695
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Vuong z-statistic (I) vs (II): 0.355 (III) vs (IV): 2.519** (V) vs (VI): 2.276**
(p-value) [0.722] [0.012] [0.023]
 
Table reports the results of OLS regressions of job flow rates on βSU, βSD and βSYM, estimated in the current quarter q, 
using public firms’ accounting data from quarters [q-3, q]. z-statistics following Vuong tests are presented at the 
bottom of each pair of columns to show the differences in R-squared between models that include βSU and βSD and 
models that include βSYM. p-values are shown in square brackets underneath the z-statistics. Variables are as defined 
in Appendix A. t-statistics shown in parentheses underneath the estimated coefficients are based on Newey and West 
(1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors with three lags. ***, **, and * indicate two-
tailed statistical significance at levels 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 8. Association between βSU, βSD and future gross job inflow rates –  
Vector autoregression models 
 
Panel A: Impulse-response graph to shock in cost behavior components 
— βSU and βSD separately 
AZt = ϕZt–k + εt, where 𝑍௧ ൌ ൫𝐽𝑜𝑏 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒௧, 𝐺𝐷𝑃௧, 𝛽ௌ௎೟/𝛽ௌ஽೟൯
ᇱ 
 
Panel B: Impulse-response graph to shock in cost behavior components 
— βSU and βSD jointly 




Table reports the results of reduced-form VAR models with 4 lags including the following variables: gross job inflow 
rate (Job Inflow Rate), real GDP growth rate (GDP), βSU, and βSD. Panel A shows the impulse-response function (IRF) 
graphs for the response of gross job inflow rate to a one-standard-deviation shock to βSU and βSD from VAR models 
that include βSU and βSD separately. Panel B shows the impulse-response function (IRF) graph for the response of gross 
job inflow rate to a one-standard-deviation shock to βSU and βSD from a VAR model that includes βSU and βSD jointly. 
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Table 9. Association between βSU, βSD and future gross job outflow rates –  
Vector autoregression models 
 
Panel A: Impulse-response graph to shock in cost behavior components 
—βSU and βSD separately 




Panel B: Impulse-response graph to shock in cost behavior components 
—βSU and βSD jointly 




Table reports the results of reduced-form VAR models with 4 lags including the following variables: gross job outflow 
rate (Job Outflow Rate), real GDP growth rate (GDP), βSU, and βSD. Panel A shows the impulse-response function 
(IRF) graphs for the response of gross job outflow rate to a one-standard-deviation shock to βSU and βSD from VAR 
models that include βSU and βSD separately. Panel B shows the impulse-response function (IRF) graph for the response 
of gross job outflow rate to a one-standard-deviation shock to βSU and βSD from a VAR model that includes βSU and 








0 2 4 6 8 10 12











0 2 4 6 8 10 12











0 2 4 6 8 10 12











0 2 4 6 8 10 12







Table 10. The association between aggregate cost elasticities and job flow rates  
— Different state-level labor protection 
Panel A: βSU and gross job-inflow rate 
  I II 
State-level labor protection High Low 
     
βSU 0.386*** 0.490*** 
 (2.747) (4.457) 
GDP 0.066** 0.083*** 
 (2.220) (4.171) 
Earnt 1.686 0.520 
 (1.027) (0.447) ∆Earnt -0.298 -0.149 
 (-0.950) (-0.689) 
MktRett -0.835 -0.697* 
 (-1.539) (-1.712) 
IPIt -0.024*** -0.025*** 
 (-3.193) (-4.813) 
Uncert -0.000 0.002 
 (-0.168) (1.171) 
CSIt 0.024*** 0.014*** 
 (3.181) (2.671) 
UICt 2.140** 1.392* 
 (2.053) (1.686) 
HWIt 0.096 0.123 
 (0.609) (1.135) 
EmpG_Dispt -0.197* -0.053 
 (-1.714) (-0.572) 
Ret_Dispt 1.520** 1.380*** 
 (2.399) (2.925) 
IRt 0.046 0.046* 
 (1.543) (1.833) 
Inft 0.112* 0.070* 
 (1.883) (1.964) 
Intercept -1.592 -0.404 
 (-1.425) (-0.542) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.887 0.930 
Observations 100 100 






Panel B: βSD and gross job-outflow rate 
  I II 
State-level labor protection High Low 
     
βSD -0.283*** -0.212*** 
 (-3.626) (-3.250) 
GDP -0.024 -0.035 
 (-0.734) (-1.409) 
Earnt -3.384** -4.721*** 
 (-2.052) (-4.031) ∆Earnt -0.523* -0.406** 
 (-1.781) (-2.390) 
MktRett -0.859 -0.878* 
 (-1.343) (-1.926) 
IPIt -0.033*** -0.036*** 
 (-4.565) (-7.209) 
Uncert -0.005** -0.003 
 (-2.511) (-1.518) 
CSIt 0.012 0.019** 
 (0.995) (2.152) 
UICt 3.968** 5.853*** 
 (2.376) (4.438) 
HWIt -0.103 0.159 
 (-0.452) (0.922) 
EmpG_Dispt 0.323 0.216 
 (1.473) (1.171) 
Ret_Dispt 1.088 1.182 
 (1.242) (1.430) 
IRt 0.243*** 0.199*** 
 (7.209) (6.029) 
Inft 0.137* 0.131** 
 (1.825) (2.343) 
Intercept 0.810 -0.993 
 (0.415) (-0.710) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.822 0.876 
Observations 100 100 
Suest chi2-statistic (I) vs (II): 3.59* 
(p-value) [0.058]
 
Table reports the results of OLS regressions of job flow rates of firms headquartered in states with high and low labor-
protection laws. A high labor-protection state is defined as a state that has adopted the good faith, implied contract, 
and public policy exceptions as of a given quarter. βSU and βSD estimated in the current quarter, using public firms’ 
accounting data from quarter [t-3,t]. Panel A reports the results of OLS regressions of gross job inflow rates on βSU, 
while Panel B reports the results of regressing gross job outflow rates on βSD. We compare the statistical difference in 
the explanatory power of βSU and βSD between the two types of states at the bottom of each panel. Variables are defined 
in Appendix A. t-statistics shown in parentheses underneath the estimated coefficients are based on Newey and West 
(1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors with three lags. ***, **, and * indicate two-
tailed statistical significance at levels 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
